








The goal of the dissertation “Truth as revelation in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology” 
is to critically analyze the new concept of truth, developed by Marion. The concept of revelation 
assumes, according to its etymology, the function of unveiling, and thus the question of truth. 
Revelation, therefore, is understood by Marion as the highest degree of truth. It is not only about 
the specific case of religious Revelation or “revealed truth,” but rather about revelation as a 
universal form of truth. Marion opposes revelation, which he describes as “uncovering,” to the 
notion of truth, which he describes as aletheia, “unconcealment.” 
The concept of truth understood as revelation is the culmination of the phenomenology 
of donation developed by Marion. Therefore, the central motive of revelation—as well as of 
the phenomenology of donation—is the break with the transcendentality of the subject, which 
would impose conditions of possibility and range of phenomenality. Therefore, in order to 
present the truth as revelation, it is necessary to first examine the assumptions, principles, 
methods, and the path of the development of the phenomenology of donation itself, for which 
the concept of truth can be the guiding thread.   
In the literature on the subject, well researched is the fundamental role of the principle 
of donation, which can also be understood as the ultimate horizon of rationality and the instance 
that triggers the reduction leading to it, previously confined to the horizon of subject or being. 
In the horizon of donation, no longer constrained by the transcendental subject or the horizon 
of being, Marion describes the “saturated phenomena” in which intuition permeates the 
concepts and intentions. In our thesis, however, we point out that the phenomenology of 
donation, understood in this way, makes up a certain element of a larger whole—both at the 
level of the chronology of Marion’s work, as well as within the very assumptions of the 
phenomenology of donation. This whole can be presented according to the following points: 
1. the given is given originally as a paradox. For Marion, paradox as what philosophy 
at first glance is not able to understand or describe, although it remains universally and perfectly 
accessible, should be the starting point of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is to make it 
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possible to see or understand paradoxes as paradoxes. Marion begins his philosophy by 
analysing the paradoxes such as idol or icon, but also by questioning the limits of metaphysics. 
2. In order to perceive and understand the paradox as such, the task of the “broadening 
of rationality” must be undertaken. As Marion notes, philosophy, unlike other sciences, does 
not have a fixed limit because it has to find it for itself. This limit is also the limit of rationality, 
the answer to the question of “what can we know.” Each age must decide within the framework 
of philosophy what kind of boundaries to set for reason and thus define what is unintelligible. 
These questions have always been put in the context of successive criticisms and aporias—
between unchangeability or change, infinite or finite, impossible or possible, experienceable or 
not, visible or invisible.  Defining these boundaries has always been the stake of philosophy. 
But it is also necessary to ask who is to define what is possible and what is not, what is 
experimental and what is not? Should the transcendental subject and his finite reason be the 
limit, which at the same time allows the conditions a priori of experience to be determined, or 
should another limit be found? 
Phenomenology is supposed to differ in its principles from previous metaphysical 
thinking precisely in that it is the very thing in its immanence that is supposed to define the 
limits of what is given, from what is not given, and thus the limits of rationality. By pointing to 
the phenomenological motto “back to the things themselves,” Marion adopts, by its essence, a 
dynamic interpretation of phenomenology as governed by principle, not doctrine or 
achievements of a particular phenomenologist. In his opinion, therefore, we can observe in 
phenomenology a transgression and broadening of the subject matter which Husserl originally 
set up and is himself already transgressing, and Heidegger continues to make significant 
changes. Later phenomenologists show further transformations, particularly of the main 
phenomenological operations, such as the constitution of meaning, intentionality and reduction. 
In this way, hermeneutics does not negate the constitution of meaning, but rather broadens its 
field of application. The primacy of ethics does not deny the principle of intentionality, but 
rather deepens its understanding in counter-intentionality, while reduction finds further and 
further applications—for example, deconstruction in Derrida 
3 This broadening, however, is ultimately supposed to make a “turn” which in the 
phenomenology of donation is only prepared. This “preparation,” understood as a effort of 
reduction, although it allows certain phenomena to appear, is also meant to “disappear” in their 
favour. If the subject carrying out the reduction is not to become a transcendental subject that 
constitutes the phenomenon, he must rather submit himself to the constitution and the 
counterintentionality of the phenomenon itself. The reduction, on the other hand, as a “counter-
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method,” is to serve only the appearance of the phenomenon itself. The phenomena that are to 
appear with the turn of reduction in Marion’s philosophy are the phenomena of love and 
revelation. 
The question of the possibility of such a turn of reduction is therefore also a question of 
the possibility of truth as revelation. The description and analysis of the phenomenology of 
donation according to these three points leads at the same time to the necessity to indicate the 
problematic structure or a certain tension contained in the very principle of this phenomenology. 
Firstly, the turn seems to be made necessarily at the cost of a certain lack of continuity 
or a break in the turn, which causes all the descriptions starting from traditional 
phenomenological notions, still visible in Being Given, to somewhat disappear in Marion’s later 
works— in which the earlier descriptions were supposed to gain full meaning. The descriptions 
of phenomena such as the face of the Other or living flesh played a certain role in Levinas and 
Henry in the whole of their philosophy (to which Marion is referring to in particular). The face 
was inscribed in ethics as the first philosophy, and flesh in the self-revelation of life. One 
explained the other in the form of a hermeneutical relationship of part to whole. These broader 
perspectives gave the phenomena of the face and the flesh their proper meaning. In dissertation 
we ask—can one also see such a broader perspective in Marion’s case which, as a whole, would 
establish the possibility of interpreting its parts? 
Secondly, one should ask about a certain paradoxicality of the “counter-method” itself, 
i.e., the very possibility of the above described “turn.” Michel Henry, referring to the principle 
of the phenomenology of donation—“so much reduction, so much givenness”— points to a 
problem which, if we may say so, is linked to excellence of this principle. For while givenness 
is the source of manifestation, then appearance is “appearance of the appearance.” For how can 
any structure or model be imposed on this process? The reduction here seems to be approaching 
the “limit,” beyond which it “paradoxically” returns to the starting point. That is why the 
reduction, working from and towards the paradoxical principle of givenness, also turns out to 
be paradoxical. Reduction is not, therefore, a method understood as a way of allowing a 
phenomenon to appear (or not only as such), but rather as a way back (according to the 
etymology: re-ducere), as an “intermediary”—from a phenomenon already given, but not yet 
received in its givenness, not appearing from itself, to the auto-manifestation of the 
phenomenon. 
Thirdly, saturated phenomena require hermeneutics, interpretation and thus language 
mediation. For Marion, hermeneutics essentially identifies itself with reduction that reinterprets 
phenomena originally declared to be objects or beings as events, because originally given. It 
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should therefore be noted—which is far from obvious—that the phenomenology of givenness 
cannot start with reduction, in the sense that reduction would make the phenomena appear (as 
transcendental phenomenology does). Phenomenology of givenness must start with an 
unreduced givenness (or pre-reduced, interpreted) i.e. hermeneutical presumptions. This first 
approach to phenomena is an original call, although at the same time it is already a response (in 
which the call is beginning to appear)—a response which, starting from a paradox, sets in 
motion reduction and hermeneutics, pursuing their given meaning. 
The goal of the thesis, therefore, is to describe the concept of truth as revelation and, at 
the same time, to trace the path followed by Marion’s thought, along the line of paradox–the 
broadening of rationality–the turn. The related research problem, imposed by our goal, is the 
question of the possibility of the turn of reduction, that is, the attempt to measure the resistance 
to which, perhaps in full accordance with the assumptions of the phenomenology of donation, 
the reduction encounters on its way to donation. The research hypothesis of our work is 
therefore the assumption of at least partial impossibility of the turn of reduction. The effects of 
the resistance encountered in the attempt to return the reduction seem to change Marion's 
phenomenology itself over time. 
 In the first part of the dissertation we reconstruct these paradoxes, i.e. the phenomena 
which, contrary to the conditions of a priori cognition, are given to thinking. Marion, on the 
one hand, in his studies of Descartes philosophy, points to the limits of modern metaphysics, 
on the other hand, in reference to Pascal, already points to their transgression through the “order 
of love.” These issues are described in chapter one. In the second chapter, we ask about the 
theological sources of Marion’s thought, especially in relation to Barth and Balthasar. Marion, 
outlines the idolatry of God’s (and love’s) thinking within the framework of metaphysics and—
initially rather negatively—the possibility of their thinking outside of metaphysics, for example, 
in the phenomenon of the icon and the notion of distance. These key issues for the development 
of Marion’s phenomenology are described in chapter three. In the fourth chapter we present 
Marion’s polemic with Heidegger thinking of God. 
In the second part of the thesis, it was be necessary to address, in the fifth chapter, the 
theme of the “theological turn” in phenomenology, the specificity of the “new French 
phenomenology,” and Marion's reference to those issues that ask about the limits of 
phenomenology itself. Then, in chapter six, we describe Marion’s phenomenology of donation. 
So we first present the role of truth in phenomenology—especially in Husserl and Heidegger. 
Next, we analyse the phenomenology of donation itself. The development of the concept of 
saturated phenomena allows Marion to place within the framework of the phenomenology of 
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donation such key phenomenological themes as the body, the face of the Other (icon), visibility 
as an idol, the eventness of the phenomena, the “phenomenology of the unapparent” and the 
possibility of maximum phenomenality in revelation.  
The broadening of rationality is done in two steps. On the one hand, the reduction is to 
lead to a donation, on the other hand, when it reaches it, it is to disappear in order not to 
overshadow the thing itself. Since the donation is both the beginning and the end of the process 
of reduction, it can be said that the culmination of the reduction is the turn. In the third part of 
the work we describe this turn, which for Marion is an opportunity to describe the phenomena 
of love and revelation with the help of the phenomenology of donation. So first, in chapter 
seven, we describe the “erotic phenomenon.” In the case of love, love itself is also a condition 
of knowledge. Moreover, love becomes a universal condition of the possibility of cognition in 
the form of “erotic truth.” If, however, the condition of the possibility of recognising the 
givenness is love, then the question should also be asked about a possible final interpretation of 
the “meaning of givenness” as love, and whether such an interpretation, though originating 
from the phenomenology of givenness (and theology), nevertheless in a certain sense does not 
exceed it (without, however, denying it) by combining two threads—theological and 
philosophical. The concept of truth as revelation, which we describe in chapter eight, is based 
both on Marion’s theological works and on his phenomenology of donation and the concept of 
“erotic truth.” We describe the new concept of truth, understood as the revelation. We are also 
trying to demonstrate, starting from Marion’s analysis, that the notion of truth as revelation may 
be the answer to the questions posed by Heidegger, who follows the thread of interpretation of 
truth understood as aletheia. 
Finally, in chapter nine, we try to assess the research problem related to the “turn of 
reduction” and the role of hermeneutics in the phenomenology of donation. Ultimately, the 
tension caused by the impossible requirement of the “counter-method” leads Marion to a certain 
reformulation of this requirement and to its new interpretation in the light of description of the 
phenomena of love and revelation. 
